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Abstract 
 
The process of social expansion in Europe can be better understood with various 
concepts related to complexity science. Findings of exploratory research show a 
typical process of social expansion in Europe in the period 1495-1945, in which 
wars have been instrumental. Furthermore, this research enables the identification 
of vulnerabilities, and the conditions for success in a process of social expansion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
European unity, the European Treaty, the limits of expansion of the European Union (EU), 
and how the EU should be governed – just to name some subjects – are extensively debated. 
The outcome of these discussions, and the discussions themselves, are of fundamental 
importance for the future of Europe. Will Europe be able to further consolidate the various 
forms of cooperation between its member states, or will – sooner or later – competition and 
conflict prevail, and as a consequence renationalization become unavoidable? Is Europe’s 
future: consolidation and expansion or fragmentation? 
Typically, the discussions about Europe’s future consist of the exchange of qualitative 
arguments, and are often only superficial. Problematic is that historical facts – as far as they 
are known and properly understood – are often selectively interpreted. Local interests of 
decision makers and their inability to understand what is at stake, make this often 
unavoidable. These biases often hinder decision-makers in Brussels and the capitals of the 
EU’s member states.  
In order to speed up Europe’s unification, these discussions should - if possible - be 
objectified. The unification of Europe is important – as I will explain in this paper – because 
Europe – as the rest of the world - will unavoidably be confronted with global and regional 
problems that require intense cooperation, in order to avoid ‘devastating’ consequences of 
these developments.  
In this paper I will show that complexity science can contribute to a more objective approach 
of these European challenges. I will show that the development of Europe towards a social 
cohesive ‘unit’ can be quantified: Europe is not a virtual reality or an artificial entity, but a 
hard ‘fact’. 
In short, the following is made clear by this research: In the last 500 years, Europe has 
developed towards a more stable condition; wars were instrumental in this process of social 
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expansion; and this process has a certain logic to it, as I will show. However, on the shorter 
term, the war dynamics between states were to a high degree unpredictable, as a consequence 
of – as I will argue – a chaotic attractor ‘normally’ influencing the war dynamics of the 
International System.  
In the International System chaos and order go hand in hand, and are closely related 
properties of this system.  
Furthermore this research not only shows that a number of properties of the International 
System can accurately be quantified, but that these properties follow a clear developmental 
path. A stable - conflict free - Europe is the outcome of this process of social expansion, 
however - as I will argue - a conflict free Europe is not automatically preserved: a number of 
conditions have to be met in order to avoid the resumption of the typical war dynamics of the 
European International System.  
In this paper I will discuss these research findings in more detail, in an effort to objectify 
discussions about Europe’s future, because new insights and concepts could well lead to new 
problem definitions and solutions. For a more technical discussion of the research findings, I 
refer to Self-Organized Characteristics of the International System (Piepers, 2007). 
 
 
2. The International System as a Complex System 
 
Complexity science is a relatively new scientific discipline, and focuses on systems that 
typically consist of a relatively large number of elements or actors, that interact on the basis of 
changing rules. Complexity science has its roots/fundaments in theoretical physics, and has 
contributed to new insights in the functioning of our climate and ecosystems.  
These systems often show a certain degree of self-organization – emergence – whereby 
interactions between the actors of the system result in unforeseen/unplanned structures and 
regularities at system – that is – macro level. Typically these systems show non-linear 
behaviour and effects; in case of these interactions cause and effect are not proportional. 
This research suggests that the International System could probably be characterised as a 
complex system. States are the actors of this system, which interact on the basis of changing 
rules, e.g. international law. These laws more or less continuously change, on the basis of the 
requirements of its member states – especially Great Powers – and the International System 
itself. Great Powers can accurately be indentified on the basis of various ‘hard’ characteristics 
(Levy, 1983). 
Four categories of basic functions/requirements of social systems – states in this context – can 
be identified (Piepers, 2006). The requirement for: (1) Internal and external security, and the 
potential to influence the behaviour of individuals and other (sub) systems, (2) Energy, 
necessities of life, and wealth, (3) Individual and collective identity and the development of 
these identities, and (4) (a) Internal and external consistency of the system itself, (b) direction 
for the (future) development of the social system, (c) acceptance of the (political) leadership 
of the social system, and (d) the possibility to control the environment of the social system. 
The integrative function is responsible for the coordinated fulfilment of the (future) 
requirements of social systems.  
These four requirements constitute subsystems, respectively: a threat system, the economy, 
the culture of the state, and the integrative system of the state. These subsystems have their 
own typical dynamics and they often compete for priority, however a minimum level of 
‘fulfilment’ of all four needs is required in order to guarantee the survival of the social system 
(a state, the EU and the International System in this context).  
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From this perspective the function of the European Union and the European Treaty is to 
structure and manage this balancing act, and to ensure the simultaneous fulfilment of the basic 
requirements of the EU’s member states, the EU itself, and preserve the integrity of the EU. 
 
 
3. Properties of the International System, influencing its Dynamics and Development 
 
Before elaborating on the findings of my research, it is important to discuss three properties of 
the International System. 
First, the International System is an anarchistic system. At a global level the International 
System lacks an accepted ‘overall’ authority, which can determine (democratically or 
otherwise) the goals, priorities and organization of the International System. In an anarchistic 
system, states are responsible for their own security. This property results in a ‘security 
dilemma’. In order to enhance their own security, states will arm themselves and participate in 
alliances, however one state its (improved) security is another state’s insecurity (Holsti, 
1995). Depending on various conditions of the International System (e.g. the polarity of the 
system), this typical property of an anarchistic system can result in a positive feedback 
mechanism; an arms race. 
The life cycle of Great Powers, concerning their capacities and status (power) is the second 
property.   
The (relative) power of states, and the resulting ranking in the International System, is not 
static, and shows a typical life cycle. In this life cycle various factors play a role: technology 
and economics, as well as  (international) obligations, requirements for military investments, 
and the flexibility of the institutions of states. As a consequence of changes in these factors, 
the (relative) power positions of states change continuously (Gilpin, 1981).  
Military power has - especially in case of ‘overstretch’ - always a downside. Military power 
does contribute to a state’s power position and status, but the required investments sooner or 
later affect the potential for economic growth and development, especially if an arms race has 
become ‘unavoidable’. Great Powers tend to become victims of their own success.  
The life cycle of states – especially of Great Powers – contribute to the build up of tension 
and frustration in an anarchistic International System. ‘Power dynamics’ not only influence 
the position and ranking of states in the International System and the system’s prestige 
hierarchy, but also have an impact of the threat perception of these states. A (feeling of) 
diminished power reinforces a feeling of vulnerability and makes decision-makers more 
insecure.  
The third property concerns the functioning and the development of international law and its 
institutions. Since the ‘forming’ of the International System – in the late 15th century – the 
International System has some ordering. This ordering is embedded in the laws and 
institutions of the system, and has regulated the (inter)actions of states. These laws and 
institutions – especially their ‘irregular’ development – have had a profound impact on the 
dynamics and development path, of the International System as well.  
The most important laws and institutions include the sovereignty principle (1648), the Concert 
of Europe (1815), the League of Nations (1919), and the United Nations (1945).  
 
 
4. Systemic Wars and Periodic Reorganization of the International System 
 
Above mentioned laws and institutions did not come about arbitrarily or coincidentally, but 
were always the outcome of large-scale Great Power wars - systemic wars – respectively: the 
Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the First and Second World War. In fact, these 
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systemic wars constitute reorganizations of the anarchistic International System. Obviously, 
the anarchistic International System lacks other means than war to periodically rebalance the 
(power) relationships and interactions in the International System.  
As is the case with Great Powers, the international system - more specifically the ordering of 
the system - has a typical life cycle and life span. International Systems become obsolete, and 
relatively stable periods are periodically punctuated by systemic wars; as explained: the 
purpose of these systemic wars is reorganization. On the longer term it is possible to discern a 
development path in the ordering of consecutive international systems.  
It can be observed that in the longer term the acceptance of the use of war as a legitimate 
instrument in international relations has diminished. New laws have progressively 
delegitimized the use of violence, and have – as a consequence - resulted in certain thresholds 
in the International System.  
These three properties of the International System – its anarchistic structure resulting in a 
security dilemma, the life cycle of Great Powers, and the development of the International 
System, progressively reducing the acceptance of the use of violence, to a high degree 
determine the functioning of the International System as a complex system. 
 
 
5. SOC-Characteristics of the International System 
 
In complexity science a special category of systems is distinguished: systems that ‘organize’ 
themselves into a critical condition. These systems are called SOC –systems; SOC stands for 
Self-Organized Criticality. 
Typically, in these systems a ‘driving force’ is at work, resulting in the build-up of tension in 
the system. Thresholds in these systems allow for the build up of tension, preventing 
immediate relieve. Incidents periodically trigger release events. After such a relieve event the 
system has new ‘space’ for the build up of tension, and the process can repeat itself. The size 
and number of the release events in these SOC-systems show a remarkable statistic 
relationship: A power law. 
The research results show that the International System has – at least in the period from 1495 
until 1945 – SOC-characteristics. 
Conflicts of interest between states, and (increasing) frustration over the functioning of the 
International System constitute the driving force of the International System, and result in the 
build up of tension. International laws and institutions form the thresholds of the International 
System. Interests of states have a threshold effect as well, e.g. the interests of Great Powers to 
maintain the status quo.  
From this perspective wars between states can be considered the release events of the 
International System. The start of the First World War, the murder of Franz Ferdinand in1914 
in Sarajevo, shows how a relatively minor incident can trigger a non-linear release event of 
systemic size; the First World War. Obviously the International System was at that stage in a 
critical condition. 
It is in accordance with the typical characteristics of a SOC-system, that the size and number 
of Great Power wars in the period 1495-1945, can be shown with a power law: The number 
and size of wars are not arbitrary, but show clear regularities. 
As discussed, four large-scale – systemic – wars can be identified. These four wars have 
resulted in the periodic reorganization - realignment - of the International System.  
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6.  Exceptional War Dynamics: Providing Additional Insights in the Workings of the 
International System 
 
During the period 1657-1763, a number of large-scale wars took place as well. However, 
these wars were of a different category, and did not result in the fundamental reorganization 
of the International System. 
From a complexity perspective it can be argued, that during this specific time frame, the 
International System lacked ‘degrees of freedom’, restricting the typical chaotic dynamics of 
the system. As a consequence a simplified, more predictable “quasi periodic” war dynamic 
emerged.  
This exceptional period can be interpreted from a historical perspective as well. Historians 
have noticed that during this time frame the international system functioned quite flexible. 
During this period the dynamics of the International System were to a high degree dominated 
by the intense rivalry between France and Great Britain. It seems that other Great Powers 
temporarily did not influence the war dynamics of the International System.  
The Cold War had a similar ‘ossifying’ effect on the war dynamics and development of the 
International System, especially in Europe. The end of the Cold War resulted in an increase in 
the degrees of freedom in the International System, and causing a ‘return’ of the (typical) 
chaotic dynamics of the International System. 
 
 
7. SOC and Punctuated Equilibrium Dynamics of the International System 
 
In complexity science, the typical dynamic of the International System - the exceptional 
period not taken into account - during which relatively stable periods (with only ‘minor’ wars) 
were punctuated by large scale and intense systemic wars, is denoted as a punctuated 
equilibrium dynamic. Typically during a punctuation – as is the case with the International 
System as well – a more fundamental development of the system takes place: It is during 
systemic wars that new rule sets for the International System are formulated and embedded. 
As explained the (new) Great Powers emerging from the latest systemic war, to a high degree 
determine the outline of the new international system. 
This research shows that the SOC-characteristics and the punctuated equilibrium dynamics of 
the International System are closely related. 
 
 
8. Development of Europe towards a Stable - Conflict Free - Condition 
 
In case a number of quantitative characteristics of the relatively stable periods - the periods 
between punctuations/systemic wars - of the International System are more closely 
researched, it shows that some interesting trends can be discerned in the development of the 
International System. 
For example it becomes clear that during the stable periods (1495-1618, 1648-1792, 1815-
1914, 1918-1939) the number of Great Power wars linearly declined.  
If this analysis is restricted to wars of European Great Powers (in the period 1495-1945, just a 
very small fraction of the total number of Great Power wars were not European Great Power 
wars), than – in line with this linear decrease – the number of Great Power wars after the 
Second World War in Europe should be reduced to (almost) nil. And this is indeed the case. 
A conclusion of this research is not only that (systemic) wars are instrumental in the periodic 
reorganization of the International System, but functional in a (European) process of social 
expansion as well. By the process of social expansion in Europe, I point to the process in 
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which various forms of cooperation were/are formed between states in Europe. This process 
includes the institutionalization of rules and forms of governance. During this process, which 
started in 1495, but is still not finalized, Europe has become stable, and conflict has been 
replaced by cooperation. 
 
 
9. The Mechanisms and Conditions resulting in Stability in Europe 
 
A relevant question is what mechanism resulted in the linear stabilizing of Europe and the 
concurrent process of social expansion. Complexity science can provide some suggestions. 
Simulations with simple models of networks show a relationship between the size and 
frequency of so called cascades that occur in these systems on the one hand, and the 
connectivity and thresholds of these systems on the other hand (Watts, 2002).  
Cascades are in fact local reorganizations of the system, comparable to release events. With 
the connectivity of the system is meant the number of connections of a node (an actor) with 
other nodes (actors). The threshold of the actors of the system determines when a node (actor) 
switches of condition (e.g. opinion). The fraction of the number of connections of an actor 
that are required to change (of position or opinion for example), before the actor itself 
changes of position or opinion, determines the threshold. 
These simulations show that by certain combinations of the connectivity of the system and 
thresholds, cascades become impossible. High connectivity and high thresholds result in a 
high local stability of the system, making cascades impossible: the system has become stable. 
These simulations provide some clues for a better understanding of the stabilizing process and 
process of social expansion in Europe. 
Wars can be perceived as cascades in the International System. Furthermore, it can be 
determined that during the period under consideration (1495-1945) the connectivity of the 
International System- and certainly of Europe – has steadily increased. This for example is 
valid for the number, reach and intensity of economic interactions between states, and the 
‘exchange’ of norms and values between actors of the International System. In addition, the 
thresholds of the International System were periodically enhanced. As discussed, the 
punctuations - systemic wars – were instrumental in this development of the thresholds of the 
International System. The development of these two characteristics of the International 
System probably explains the (linear) decrease of the number of Great Power wars in Europe.  
Ultimately – that is the conclusion based on these simulations – as a consequence of the 
increased connectivity and thresholds in Europe, the security dilemma and the thus the driving 
force were neutralized.  
But this is only part of the explanation for the process of social expansion. Other factors were 
– are – important as well. 
Another important factor in the process of social expansion in Europe has been the gradual 
development of a shared perspective on the future of Europe, facilitated and stimulated by the 
troubled history of the continent.  
The Cold War has played on important role as well. The Cold War provided favourable 
conditions for the structural neutralization of the security dilemma in Europe. The Cold War - 
with the United States and the Soviet Union as its two major protagonists - deprived 
(European) states of the ‘opportunity’ to wage war: the system was ‘frozen’, severely 
restricting the war dynamics in the International System. The Cold War thus provided an 
opportunity to intensify cooperation; economic, political and military, and time to embed – 
institutionalize – this cooperation.  
It is important that in this new European System, the release of tension and frustration can be 
facilitated, without the ‘necessity’ of going to war. Further institutionalization of the 
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connectivity of the system (political and economic cooperation), thresholds concerning the 
use of conflict, and the development of a shared perspective on Europe’s future, are essential 
building blocks of a stable and prosperous Europe as well. But even this is not enough.  
An effective political system and process to regulate tensions and frustration are required as 
well. Democracy is such a political system. The evolutionary success of democracy as an 
effective political system is convincing evidence: democracy and survival are closely related, 
as history shows. 
 
 
10.  A Less Attractive Alternative: Fragmentation 
 
The following process could evolve if the process of social expansion is derailed, that is if 
proper consolidation is not achieved: cooperation starts to falter, and will be replaced by 
competition, the connectivity of the system will be affected as a consequence, democratic 
structures – as far as they are now available – will become (even) less effective, hindering the 
release of tension and frustration. National interests will replace common – European – 
interests and next, the local stability of the system will be affected, and the security dilemma 
reactivated, ‘enabling’ conflicts. In this scenario the (European) process of social expansion is 
replaced by a process of social fragmentation.  
Fragmentation processes are not new to our International System; failed states are a typical 
example. So don’t take stability in Europe for granted. Stability needs constant effort and 
commitment to be maintained. 
 
 
11. Urgency is required: The Centrifugal Effects of Global Challenges and Threats 
 
Urgency is required to further develop and embed institutional structures in Europe. Europe, 
as will the rest of the world, will be confronted with a series of challenges and threats, that 
require more than just a local - that is state-level or regional - response: climate change, 
(nuclear) terrorism, poverty, shortage of commodities, etc. etc. These challenges and threats 
will test Europe’s fragile fabric, and the willingness of its member states to cooperate and 
compromise.  
These research findings not only provide insight in the functioning and in the conditions for 
success for an effective European Union, but can contribute to the Europe debate as well. We 
now better understand what the EU’s vulnerabilities are, what our priorities should be and 
what we should be talking about  
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